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I. INTRODUCTION
1

In Abraham v. County of Hennepin, the Minnesota Supreme
Court held that there exists a state constitutional right to a jury trial
2
under both the Whistleblower Act and the Minnesota
3
Occupational Safety and Health Act (MOSHA). The provision of
the Minnesota Constitution upon which the court relied was Article
I, Section 4, which provides, in relevant part, that “[t]he right of
trial by jury shall remain inviolate, and shall extend to all cases at
†
1.
2.
3.

Professor of Law, William Mitchell College of Law.
639 N.W.2d 342 (Minn. 2002) [hereinafter Abraham II].
M INN. STAT. § 191.932, subd. 1(a) (2000).
M INN. STAT. § 182.654, subd. 9 (2000).
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4

law without regard to the amount in controversy.” In this essay I
shall seek to identify and evaluate the method of constitutional
interpretation the court used in arriving at its conclusion.
There are many ways of distinguishing and classifying methods
of constitutional interpretation. One of the standard approaches,
the one I shall use here, distinguishes between originalist and non5
originalist methods. The basic recommendation of originalism is
that in interpreting a written constitution, judges should restrict
themselves to invoking principles and norms that are explicitly
6
stated, or at least implicit in, the document itself. In contrast,
nonoriginalist approaches maintain that it is legitimate, and
perhaps even necessary, for judges interpreting a written
constitution to invoke principles and norms from sources which
have nothing to do with the language of the original document, the
historical intentions motivating that language, the implicit
structure presupposed by the document, or the document’s
7
historical context. I shall refer to such sources as non-originalist
sources. They might include a great variety of items, e.g., current
8
systematic political philosophies (e.g., John Rawls ), ideologies of
current political parties, prevailing attitudes in society, personal
ideologies of judges, and so forth.
Of course, this way of contrasting the two approaches is very
crude and overlooks a great many technical issues and distinctions
(e.g., the existence of many distinct forms of both originalist and
9
non-originalist approaches). But it will do for the purpose of this
essay. The fundamental contrast I am interested in is that between
approaches which restrict themselves, in one way or another, to the
historical document itself, as opposed to approaches which, in one
way or another, refuse to so restrict themselves.
My objective is modest. I shall make no effort to argue the
merits of the controversy between proponents of originalist
methods and proponents of non-originalist methods. Rather, I
shall analyze the court’s opinion in terms of the contrast between
the two methods of constitutional interpretation. In particular, I
shall argue (1) that in Abraham the court attempted to combine
4. M INN. CONST. art. I, § 4.
5. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 525 (2d ed. 2002), for a helpful overview of the distinction.
6. Id. at 17.
7. Id.
8. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1999).
9. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 5, for an account of many of these varieties.
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these two methods; (2) that this effort was misguided because the
methods are mutually incompatible; and (3) that, despite what the
court said, its decision is best understood as the result of applying a
non-originalist method.
II. FACTS & PROCEDURAL HISTORY
A. Facts
David Abraham and Scott Lennander worked as offset
10
equipment operators in Hennepin County’s print shop. In
February 1995 they complained to their supervisor, Theresa
11
Schaffer, about the air quality in the shop and stated that the
fumes in the workplace were making them ill, causing them to have
12
headaches, nausea, and difficulty breathing.
A property
management worker informed Schaffer, Abraham, and Lennander
that the shop ventilation system had been closed periodically for
13
asbestos abatement work.
On March 2, 1995, Abraham filed a written complaint with the
Occupational Safety and Health Division of the Minnesota
Department of Labor and Industry (“Safety & Health Division),
reporting the closed ventilation system and stating that employees
of the county’s print shop believed that they were faced with an
14
immediate health threat due to chemicals in the air. The
complaint resulted in an unannounced MOSHA inspection of the
15
shop on March 22, 1995.
Abraham and Lennander’s co-worker, Michael Fishman,
claimed that he saw Lennander sprinkle chemicals on the print
16
shop carpeting during the inspector’s visit. Fishman also claimed
that he later saw Abraham wave a spray can in the air and heard
17
him say, “Let’s get some fumes going in here.” Fishman reported
these observations to other co-workers, and Schaffer eventually

10. Abraham II, supra note 1, at 346.
11. Abraham v. County of Hennepin, 622 N.W.2d 121, 124 (Minn. Ct. App.
2001) [hereinafter Abraham I].
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.; Abraham II, supra note 1, at 346.
15. Abraham I, supra note 11, at 124.
16. Id.
17. Id.
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18

asked him about what he had seen and heard.
Five days after the inspection, Abraham and Lennander were
19
suspended. The county notified them four days later that their
employment would be terminated on April 7, 1995, because they
20
had tried to skew the results of the MOSHA inspection.
Lennander was discharged for intentionally pouring chemicals on
carpeting in the work area during the inspection, and Abraham was
discharged for intentionally spraying chemicals into the air during
21
the same inspection.
B. Procedural History
Abraham and Lennander subsequently filed claims for
22
retaliatory discharge. They sued the county, alleging that their
23
discharges violated the anti-reprisal provisions in MOSHA, the
24
25 26
Whistleblower Act, and the Minnesota Human Rights Act.
The
district court granted summary judgment for the county, dismissing
27
all claims. Abraham and Lennander appealed only the dismissal
28
of the MOSHA and whistleblower claims. The Minnesota Court
of Appeals remanded the case and directed the district court to
determine whether the county’s discharges were more likely than
not motivated by retaliation, even if the county had a legitimate
29
reason for the discharges.
On remand, the district court ruled that MOSHA provided the
exclusive remedy for alleged reprisals and dismissed the
30
whistleblower claim. Abraham and Lennander moved for a jury
31
trial on the MOSHA claim. The district court denied this motion
32
and conducted a bench trial. At the end of a two-week trial, the
court found that the county discharged Abraham and Lennander
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Abraham II, supra note 1, at 346.
Id.
M INN. STAT. § 182.669 (1996).
M INN. STAT. § 181.932 (1996).
M INN. STAT. § 363.03, subd. 7 (1996).
Abraham I, supra note 11, at 124.
Abraham II, supra note 1, at 345.
Id.
Id.
Abraham I, supra note 11, at 124.
Id.
Id.
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for intentionally introducing chemicals into their work area on the
day of the inspection and that the county had not violated the
33
MOSHA anti-reprisal law.
After a second appeal, the Minnesota Court of Appeals held
that Abraham and Lennander were not entitled to a jury trial for
either their claim under the Whistleblower Act or their claim under
34
MOSHA. Distinguishing between “(1) actions at law from causes
in equity, and (2) actions existing at the adoption of the
35
constitution from actions created later,” the court of appeals
interpreted Article I, Section 4 of the Minnesota Constitution as
providing for a right to a jury trial in civil cases only for causes of
action which are actions at law (i.e., actions for damages) and
36
which existed under the state of Minnesota law prevailing in 1857.
Both conditions are necessary:
[T]he claim must be an action at law and must have
existed when the state constitution was adopted. The
mere fact that a claim is solely for the recovery of money
will not suffice.
If that were the case, workers’
compensation claims and human rights act claims, being
actions for the recovery of money, would carry a
constitutional entitlement to jury trial. But because these
actions did not exist when the constitution
was adopted,
37
they do not carry jury trial rights.
Thus, the court of appeals concluded that, although claims for
money damages bought under the Whistleblower Act and MOSHA
qualify as actions at law, they are not entitled to jury trials under
the Minnesota Constitution because they did not exist as part of the
38
common law when the constitution was adopted. Importantly, the
Legislature could have conferred a right to a jury trial in civil actions
39
brought under the new statutes, but it chose not to do so.

33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.

Abraham II, supra note 1, at 345.
Abraham I, supra note 11, at 129.
Id. at 125.
See id. at 125-26.
Id. at 126.
Id.
Id. at 125.

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2002

5

William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 29, Iss. 2 [2002], Art. 9
FINAL PANNIER ABRAHAM.DOC

270

WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW

10/28/2002 10:42 PM

[Vol. 29:2

III. ARGUMENTS ADVANCED BY THE PARTIES IN THE MINNESOTA
SUPREME COURT
Conceding that neither the Whistleblower Act nor MOSHA
provides for a statutory right to a jury trial, the appellants argued
that they nevertheless had rights to jury trials under Article I,
Section 4, of the Minnesota State Constitution because the actions
they brought were “legal in nature” and sought only the “recovery
40
of money.” The appellants rejected any interpretation of Article I,
Section 4’s phrase “cases at law” which would construe it as
referring to the particular state of the common law existing in the
Territory of Minnesota in 1857, the year in which the State
Constitution was adopted. In short, they maintained that the jury
trial provision of Article I, Section 4 should not be construed as
providing for a constitutional right to a jury trial only for causes of
41
action existing under Minnesota common law as of 1857. On the
affirmative side, they argued that it ought to be read as providing
for a right to a jury trial in any case which is “legal in nature,”
whether or not a case of that kind could have been successfully
42
brought in the Territory of Minnesota in 1857. According to the
appellants, the only legally relevant question is whether such a case
could be correctly categorized as being legal in nature and seeking
43
only money damages under present Minnesota law.
The county argued (1) that neither the Whistleblower Act nor
MOSHA explicitly provides for a right to a jury trial; and (2) that
there is no state constitutional right to a jury trial under either
statute because neither statutory cause of action existed in 1857
44
when the Minnesota Constitution was adopted. More broadly,
with respect to (2), the county argued that in 1857 there was no
common law cause of action for wrongful discharge against
employers and that, in any case, in 1857 the doctrine of sovereign
immunity shielded municipalities from actions of any kind,
45
including, but not limited to, actions for wrongful discharge.

40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.

Abraham II, supra note 1, at 348.
Id. at 349.
Id.
Abraham I, supra note 11, at 125.
Abraham II, supra note 1, at 348.
Id.
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IV. THE SUPREME COURT’ S HOLDING
A. Framing of the Issue
As the court saw it, the issue was “whether Article I, Section 4
of the Minnesota Constitution guarantees the right to trial by jury
in an action, such as this, in which an employee seeks only money
damages for retaliatory discharge from employment in violation of
46
the Whistleblower Act and MOSHA,” where Article I, Section 4
provides that “[t]he right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate, and
shall extend to all cases at law without regard to the amount in
47
controversy.”
Why did the court regard this as the issue? Because the
appellants had demanded a jury trial and since neither the
Whistleblower Act nor MOSHA explicitly provides for a right to a
jury trial, “that right, if it exists, must arise under the
48
constitution.” In this regard, the court obviously presupposed the
existence of only two possible legal sources for a right to a jury trial
under Minnesota law: State statutes, on the one hand, and the State
49
Constitution, on the other. Thus, the court apparently did not
think that it would be permissible for Minnesota courts to extract a
right to a jury trial from common law principles which were not
themselves grounded in the Constitution.
B. Interpretation of Minnesota Constitution Article I, Section 4
What did the court take to be the intended meaning of Article
I, Section 4? In answering that question, I shall follow closely the
court’s own sequence of analysis.
The court began by noting that its prior decisions have
“consistently acknowledged the distinction between actions at law,
for which the constitution guarantees a right to jury trial, and
actions in equity, for which there is no constitutional right to jury
50
trial.” Thus, it seems clear that the court agreed with the court of
appeals on at least the proposition that a necessary condition for
having a constitutional right to a jury trial in a civil case is bringing

46.
47.
48.
49.
50.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 349.
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a claim at law for money damages. That is, it appears that the court
agreed with the first of the two necessary (and together sufficient)
conditions for a constitutional right to a jury trial in a civil case
specified by the court of appeals.
But what about the court of appeals’ second condition,
namely, that a constitutional right to a jury trial exists only for
common-law actions which existed under Minnesota law as of 1857?
On the one hand, it might well seem that the court agreed. For, it
said that this provision “was intended to continue, unimpaired and
inviolate, the right to trial by jury as it existed in the Territory of
51
Minnesota when our constitution was adopted in 1857.” Standing
alone, that sentence appears to adopt the court of appeals’ second
condition.
On the other hand, however, the rest of the court’s discussion
strongly suggests that, whatever the court itself may have intended
by that sentence, it certainly did not mean what the court of
Appeals would have meant had it used those words. As the court
explained:
[T]his court has not held that only those causes of action
that were identified in 1857 as causes of action at law carry
today an attendant right to jury trial. Rather, the
constitutional right exists for the same type of action for
which a jury trial existed when the constitution was
adopted, any cause of action at law. The constitution is
not frozen in time in 1857, incapable of application to the
law as it evolves. The nature and character of the
controversy, as determined from all the pleadings and by
the relief sought, determines whether the cause of action
is one at law today, and thus
carries an attendant
52
constitutional right to jury trial.
But what precisely does this mean? Fully grasping the court’s
intended sense requires a close examination of the way in which
the court applied these words to its own precedents and to the
Abraham litigation.
One of its precedents the court examined was Olson v.
53
Synergistic Technologies Business Systems, Inc., a case in which it had
ruled that a party bringing a claim for promissory estoppel has no
constitutional right to a jury trial. In Abraham the court said that it
51.
52.
53.

Id. at 348.
Id. at 349 (citations omitted).
628 N.W.2d 142 (Minn. 2001).

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol29/iss2/9

8

Pannier: Abraham's Theory of Constitutional Interpretation
FINAL PANNIER ABRAHAM.DOC

2002]

CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION

10/28/2002 10:42 PM

273

had ruled as it had in Olson because the action brought there was
54
an equitable, rather than a legal, claim. In particular, the court
observed that it
traced the historical progression of promissory estoppel
not to determine whether promissory estoppel was a cause
of action at law in 1857, but only to determine whether
promissory estoppel evolved in Minnesota as an equitable
or legal cause of action, and therefore whether promissory
estoppel is a cause of action at law or a cause of action in
equity in Minnesota today, for in different jurisdictions the
cause of 55action for promissory estoppel evolved
differently,
and that it had concluded that “in Minnesota promissory estoppel
evolved as an equitable action, for which there is no right to trial by
56
jury.”
In resolving the question whether there is a constitutional
right to a jury trial with respect to any particular claim, the court
said that it must “examine the nature and character of the
controversy . . . as determined from the pleadings and by the relief
57
sought.”
1. Common Law Precedent
Turning to the statutory claims brought in Abraham, the court
characterized them as “a species of the common law action of
58
wrongful discharge.” It then turned to a historical analysis of the
evolution of that common law action. By way of prefatory
comment, the court said that such a historical examination is not
required to look back to 1857 in order to decide “whether wrongful
59
discharge existed then as a cause of action at law.” Rather, “we
need only determine whether a claim for wrongful discharge
seeking only money damages is an action at law or an equitable
60
action.”
In making that determination, the sole question is
whether a cause of action for wrongful discharge seeking only
61
money damages has now evolved into an action at law.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.

Abraham II, supra note 1, at 350.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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The court then traced the evolution of the cause of action for
62
wrongful discharge back to an 1861 case, Mackubin v. Clarkson, in
which the court had ruled that an employee could bring a breach63
of-contract action for damages for wrongful termination. Citing a
series of later breach-of-contract cases, the court said, “[a]s contract
actions brought in a court of law for money damages, claims for
wrongful discharge were causes of action at law, and they were
64
consequently tried to juries.” Of course, even conceding that this
line of cases can be traced back to 1861 (and notice that 1861
comes after 1857, the latter of which might well be regarded as the
legally relevant year) would not, by itself, help the cause of the
Abraham appellants. They had not brought breach-of-contract
claims, but rather statutory claims.
The court then discussed the origin and evolution of the
doctrine that “absent an employment contract for a specified term,
employment is ‘at-will,’ meaning either the employee or the
employer may end the employment relationship at any time for any
65
reason.” The at-will doctrine was applied in the 1936 case of
66
Skagerberg v. Blandin Paper Co. Now, at first glance, it might well
seem that the at-will doctrine advances the appellants’ cause no
further than did the earlier line of breach-of-contract cases, which
is to say, not at all. For, at least prima facie, absent statutory
protection against retaliatory discharge, the appellants would have
had no cause of action at all, much less a cause of action at law.
However, the court went on to observe that “the common law
doctrine of employment has been narrowed in the 66 years since
Skagerberg” and that “[i]n many jurisdictions, courts have
recognized an exception to the doctrine of employment at will,
allowing a cause of action when the employee is wrongfully
67
discharged.”
With respect to more recent developments in
68
Minnesota, in Phipps v. Clark Oil & Refining Corp., the court of
appeals ruled that there exists an exception to the at-will doctrine
when an employee is terminated for refusing to engage in unlawful

62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
1986).

5 Minn. 247 (1861).
Abraham II, supra note 1, at 350.
Id. at 351.
Id.
197 Minn. 291, 266 N.W. 872 (1936).
Id.
408 N.W.2d 569 (Minn. 1986), aff’g 396 N.W.2d 588 (Minn. Ct. App.
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69

conduct. After the supreme court granted review, but before
publication of its decision, the Minnesota Legislature enacted the
70
Whistleblower Act. The Abraham court said that at that point it no
longer had to decide the general policy question whether the State
of Minnesota should follow those states that had recognized a
71
common law cause of action for wrongful discharge. However,
since the Phipps employee had been terminated prior to the
effective date of the Whistleblower Act, the latter statute could not
72
ground his claim.
Hence, according to the Abraham court’s
analysis, it was compelled to decide whether that particular plaintiff
73
could proceed at common law. The court said that it “allowed the
employee to pursue his common law cause of action for wrongful
discharge, and . . . agreed that the common law protects those fired
74
for their refusal to violate the law.” Thus, the Abraham court
apparently committed itself to the proposition that, immediately
prior to the effective date of the Whistleblower Act, employees who
were terminated for refusing to violate the law had a common law
cause of action at law for retaliatory discharge under Minnesota
75
law.
2. Statutory Claims
Having completed its overview of the development of the
common law cause of action for wrongful discharge in Minnesota,
the court turned to an analysis of the statutory claims brought by
76
the appellants, remarking that “[w]hile the causes of action
before us are statutory claims for wrongful discharge, our analysis
of the right to jury trial remains the same: are these claims for
retaliatory discharge seeking only money damages causes of action
77
at law?”
69. Id.
70. Id. at 351-52.
71. Id. at 352.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id. However, note that the court also confusingly stated, “Because of the
enactment of the Whistleblower Act, we acknowledged in Phipps that we did not
have to resolve the policy question whether Minnesota should recognize a
common law cause of action for wrongful discharge.” Id. Perhaps it means to say
that although it did not have to resolve the question, it did so anyway. Presumably,
the court of appeals was puzzled as well. See Abraham I, supra note 11, at 127.
76. Abraham II, supra note 1, at 352.
77. Id.
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In that regard, the court first characterized a claim for
78
wrongful discharge as a “tort” claim. After observing that a
retaliatory discharge claim is one kind of wrongful discharge claim,
the court concluded that “[a] whistleblower claim that arises from
alleged retaliatory conduct by the employer intended to injure the
employee for engaging in lawful conduct or for reporting unlawful
79
conduct . . . is a tort.” The court also noted that not only is a
retaliatory discharge claim a tort claim, but it is also a claim “for
which the law recognizes a right to consequential money damages
80
in an action in district court.” In sum, as “a tort action seeking
only money damages in a district court,” a retaliatory discharge
81
claim is “a cause of action at law.”
Applying these general principles to the Abraham claims, the
court characterized them as “tort claims, brought in the district
court, seeking only consequential money damages,” and concluded
that “the nature and character of the controversy support the
conclusion that a whistleblower claim seeking only money damages
82
is an action at law.”
3. Theory of Relief
The court next turned to the question of the “theory of relief”
83
upon which the appellants’ claims were based. It observed that,
according to its own precedents, seeking monetary relief is not by
84
itself a sufficient condition for a constitutional right to a jury trial.
For example, in Indianhead Truck Line, Inc. v. Hvidsten
85
Transportation, Inc., the court had refused to recognize a
constitutional right to a jury trial with respect to actions for specific
performance seeking money damages as part of the equitable relief
requested, as contrasted with actions seeking money damages for
86
breach of contract. Thus, whereas claims for money damages are
usually classifiable as legal claims, the court said that it would not
permit a litigant to “cloak or disguise an equitable action simply by

78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.

Id.
Id. at 352-53.
Id. at 353.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
268 Minn. 176, 128 N.W.2d 334 (1964).
Abraham II, supra note 1, at 353.
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87

its prayer for relief.”
However, despite the fact that seeking money damages is not
by itself sufficient to guarantee a right to a jury trial, it is
nonetheless an important factor in the inquiry whether a particular
88
claim is legal or equitable in nature. In that regard, the court
said, “because we look to the nature and character of the
controversy as determined from all the pleadings, including the
relief sought, the nature of the relief sought is important in
determining whether a claim is legal or equitable, and as noted,
claims for consequential money damages are typically legal
89
claims.” Thus, since the Abraham appellants did not seek equitable
relief under either the Whistleblower Act or MOSHA, but only
money damages, the court’s examination of the relief sought “. . .
supports the conclusion that a whistleblower claim seeking only
90
money damages is an action at law.”
91
The court then addressed its rulings in Breimhorst v. Beckman
92
and Ewert v. City of Winthrop. With respect to Breimhorst, the
supreme court said that its analysis in the Abraham case was not
altered by that earlier holding.
In Breimhorst, we recognized that the legislature abolished
a common law cause of action for an employee injured on
the job, replacing it with a remedy under the Workers’
Compensation Act, a statutory remedy that was new,
adequate, and fundamentally different from the common law
cause of action. The legislature took the cause of action
out of the district court and placed it in a quasi-judicial
forum. We concluded that when the legislature abolished
a common law cause of action and substituted a remedy
that was new, adequate, and fundamentally different from
that which was provided at common law, there was no
constitutional right to a jury. We did not hold in Breimhorst
that the legislature could deny the constitutional right to
jury trial when
it codifies, creates, or modifies a cause of
93
action at law.
With respect to its holding in Ewert, the court said:

87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
227 Minn. 409, 35 N.W.2d 719 (1949).
278 N.W.2d 545 (Minn. 1979).
Abraham II, supra note 1, at 353-54.
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In Ewert, we held that the Minnesota Constitution does
not provide the right to trial by jury to one who appeals a
special assessment. We stated that the right to appeal a
special assessment arises exclusively from statute and does
not exist at common law, and as such, there is no
attendant right to jury trial in appeals from special
assessments. We did not hold in Ewert that all statutory
causes of action are equitable actions with no right to jury
trial. When a statutory cause of action is legal in nature, it
falls within the parameters of those ‘cases 94
at law’ for which
there is a constitutional right to jury trial.
The court went on to reaffirm earlier decisions, holding that,
although the legislature may expand the right to a jury trial beyond
the scope of the constitutional guarantee, it may not eliminate the
constitutional right to a jury trial “merely by codifying or modifying
95
a common law cause of action.”
By way of clarification, the court noted that:
To the extent that we suggested in Breimhorst that the
legislature may limit the constitutional right to a jury by
simply codifying or modifying a common law cause of
action, and to the extent that we suggested in Ewert that a
statutory cause of action may never carry a constitutional
right to jury trial, we clarify today that the right to a jury
trial applies to all causes of action at law, regardless of96
whether the legislature has codified the cause of action.
The court concluded by holding that a retaliatory-discharge
action brought under the Whistleblower Act and MOSHA and
seeking only money damages is a cause of action at law for which
97
there is a constitutional right to a jury trial.
V. ANALYSIS OF THE COURT’ S HOLDING
A. Structure
This section details the essential structure of the court’s
analysis. I am not certain that my analysis matches exactly what the
court had in mind, but at the very least, it seems to be a plausible
interpretation of the decision.
94.
95.
96.
97.

Id. at 354 (citations omitted).
Id.
Id.
Id.
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Suppose that C is a statutory cause of action brought pursuant
to a Minnesota statute S. Suppose further that S does not provide
for a right to a jury trial. The question is whether a litigant who
brings C nonetheless has a right to a jury trial under the Minnesota
Constitution. I propose that the essence of the court’s analysis can
be adequately formulated in terms of the following series of
questions and answers:
[1] What is the ultimate legal question?
[a] The ultimate legal question is whether C would be
currently classified as a cause of action at law under
present Minnesota law. If so, then C is protected by a
constitutional right to a jury trial.
[2] Thus, are we to understand that it is not legally relevant
that C may not have itself existed as a cause of action under
Minnesota law in 1857?
[a] That is correct.
[3] Upon what aspects or elements of the lawsuit in which C is
asserted should a court focus its attention in order to
determine whether C would be currently classified as a
cause of action at law under present Minnesota law?
[a] The court should examine (1) the “nature and
character of the controversy” and (2) the “relief
sought.”
[4] With respect to the relief sought:
[a] Is seeking money damages a necessary condition for
being constitutionally entitled to a jury trial?
{1} Yes.
[b] Is seeking money damages a sufficient condition for
being constitutionally entitled to a jury trial?
{1} No. A request for money damages which is
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incorporated in a more comprehensive claim for
equitable relief would not be constitutionally
entitled to a jury trial. The claim for relief must be
solely a claim for money damages.
[5] With respect to the nature and character of the
controversy:
[a] Does it matter that C is a statutory cause of action, as
opposed to a common-law cause of action? In other
words, is it only common-law causes of action which are
constitutionally guaranteed jury trials?
{1} No. Being a statutory cause of action is not a fatal
defect.
[b] Is it necessary that C, along with its authorizing statute
S, existed under Minnesota law in 1857, the date the
Minnesota Constitution was adopted?
{1} No.
[c] Does that mean that any statutory cause of action, qua
statutory cause of action, carries with it a constitutional
right to a jury trial?
{1} No.
[d]What then is the criterion for identifying those
statutory causes of action for which there is a
constitutional right to a jury trial?
{1} A statutory cause of action is protected by a
constitutional right to a jury trial if and only if:
{a} that statutory cause of action merely codified or
modified a pre-existing common-law cause of
action, as opposed to creating a statutory cause
of action which was new or fundamentally different
from any common-law cause of action existing at
the time of the statute’s enactment;
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{b} that pre-existing common-law cause of action
possessed the following legal attributes:
<1> It was, immediately prior to its
transformation into a statutory cause of
action, classifiable as an action at law; and
<2> It had, by the time of its transformation into
statutory form, evolved, by means judicial
interpretive expansion, from a common-law
98
root, an action at law that existed under
Minnesota law as of 1857.
[e] Is it necessary for the statutory cause of action to be a
recognizable version of the common-law root, as the
latter existed in 1857?
{1} No. All that is necessary is that the common-law
root eventually evolved, through judicial
99
interpretive expansion, into a common-law derivative
that can be recognized in the statutory cause of
action.
[f] What is an example of a statutory cause of action that
created a cause of action which was new or
fundamentally different from any common-law cause of
action existing at the time of the statute’s enactment?
{1} The statutory creation of an employee’s remedies
100
under the Workers’ Compensation Act.
98. This is my term, not the court’s. I use it because it illuminates the court’s
conception.
99. Again, this is my term, not the court’s.
100. It should be noted that this analytic outline does not account for every
aspect of the court’s discussion. For example, I have omitted any reference to the
possibility of a statute “creating” a common-law cause of action, as in “codifies,
creates, or modifies a cause of action at law.” Abraham II, supra note 1, at 354. It
seems to me that the concept of a statutory cause of action being itself a commonlaw cause of action is self-contradictory. I assume that the court did not intend to
say that, but what it did mean is not clear to me. In any case, it seems to me that
the court’s point can be adequately expressed with just the verbs “codifies” and
“modifies” alone.
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B. Underlying Theory of Constitutional Interpretation
What is the nature of the underlying method of constitutional
interpretation the court applied in Abraham? In particular, is it an
application of an originalist method or a non-originalist method?
On the one hand, at the beginning of its discussion the court
offered a remark that, if considered by itself, strongly suggests an
originalist approach. With respect to the jury-trial provision of the
Minnesota Constitution, the court said, “[t]his provision is
intended to continue, unimpaired and inviolate, the right to trial
by jury as it existed in the Territory of Minnesota when our
101
constitution was adopted in 1857.” There are at least two reasons
for thinking that this assertion suggests the invocation of an
originalist method.
First, the assertion focuses upon the state of Minnesota law in
1857, the year in which the Minnesota Constitution was adopted. It
would be odd for any full-blooded use of a non-originalist method
to pay attention to the historical context of a constitution. For, that
would suggest that the primary question is, “What did the
Constitution mean then?” Presumably, for a non-originalist the
primary question is rather, “What does the living Constitution mean
now?,” where it is implicitly presupposed that this latter question
must be answered by looking to what I have called non-originalist
sources, that is, sources other than the original document, its
intentions, structure, or historical context.
Second, the court used the verb “is intended” in referring to
the constitutional provision in question. The use of that verb also
suggests the implicit invocation of an originalist approach insofar
as it draws the reader’s attention to the historical intentions
motivating the provision. Presumably, non-originalists would not
be especially concerned with what the historical intentions
motivating any particular constitutional provision may or may not
have been.
In sharp contrast, the reader is presumably startled to
encounter these words just a few lines later:
This court has not held that only those causes of action
that were identified in 1857 as causes of action at law carry
today an attendant right to jury trial. Rather, the
constitutional right exists for the same type of action for
which a jury trial existed when the constitution was
101.

Abraham II, supra note 1, at 348.

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol29/iss2/9

18

Pannier: Abraham's Theory of Constitutional Interpretation
FINAL PANNIER ABRAHAM.DOC

2002]

CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION

10/28/2002 10:42 PM

283

adopted, any cause of action at law. The constitution is
not frozen in time in 1857, incapable of application to the
law as it evolves. The nature and character of the
controversy, as determined from all the pleadings and by
the relief sought, determines whether the cause of action
is one at law today, and thus
carries an attendant
102
constitutional right to jury trial.
Whatever this language suggests, it certainly does not suggest
an originalist method of constitutional interpretation. Rather, it is
a paradigm of non-originalist language. Here we see the familiar
non-originalist concept of a “living” constitution, with all its
attendant characteristics. The court might well have quoted Justice
William Brennan’s well-known remarks in this regard:
We current Justices read the Constitution in the only way
that we can: as Twentieth-Century Americans. We look to
the history of the time of framing and to the intervening
history of interpretation. But the ultimate question must
be, what do the words of the text mean in our time? For
the genius of the Constitution rests not in any static
meaning it might have had in a world that is dead and
gone, but in the adaptability of its great principles to cope
with current problems and current needs. What the
constitutional fundamentals meant to the wisdom of other
103
times cannot be their measure to the vision of our time.
C. Originalism v. Non-Originalism
According to the originalist conception, a constitution is (1) a
set of legal principles, which are (2) expressed in terms of
particular sentences, that, in turn, are (3) contained in a particular
historical document, and (4) whose semantical meanings are
functions of the particular historical context in which that
document was adopted, including at the very least the particular
intentions of those responsible for choosing those particular
104
sentences to express those intentions.
On the other hand, according to the non-originalist approach,
a constitution is not a historically rooted and historically expressed
set of legal principles. It is rather conceived of primarily as
102. Id.
103. William J. Brennan, Jr., The Constitution of the United States: Contemporary
Ratification, reprinted in INTERPRETING THE CONSTITUTION: THE DEBATE OVER
ORIGINAL INTENT, 23, 27 (Jack N. Rakove, ed. 1990).
104. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 5 at 17-18.
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whatever set of principles a particular group of persons (namely,
the final court in the jurisdiction) happens to presently select as
the constraints that, as a matter of contemporary political and
philosophical considerations, ought to be imposed upon
governmental power. Indeed, there is an important sense in which
non-originalists do not think of a constitution as a set of principles at
all. Rather, it is thought of primarily as a particular set of persons
who have been presently assigned the legal power to tell society
what “constitutional law” now requires.
Obviously, these two approaches result in dramatically
different conceptions of what it means for a society to follow the
Rule of Law. Originalist methods are essentially tied to the idea that
a sophisticated legal system typically operates in distinct stages (at
least on the constitutional and statutory levels): (1) rule formation
and enactment by the people or their representatives; (2) rule
interpretation and application by the courts; and (3) rule
enforcement by the executive agency. In contrast, non-originalist
methods tend to think of rules of law as continually in the process
of creation, where that creative process is ultimately in the hands of
judges. In other words, such methods tend to collapse the first two
stages of the originalist analysis and commit both to the ultimate
power of the courts. This is essentially the legal-realist conception
105
of legal rules, famously articulated by Holmes. There is no legal
rule at all until some particular court declares: “This is what the
rule is here.”
One of the consequences of using a non-originalist method of
constitutional interpretation is the availability of two methods of
amending a constitution. On the one hand, there is the method of
following the explicit provisions governing the process of formal
amendment contained in the document itself. On the other hand,
there is the method of amending the constitution by the judicial
techniques of non-originalist interpretation. Indeed, one of the
primary arguments offered in support of non-originalist
interpretative methods is the relative difficulty of formally
amending constitutions, as compared with the relative ease of
106
amending them by non-originalist judicial methods. In fact, once
permitting oneself the use of non-originalist judicial amendment of
the original document, there would presumably be little or no
105. See Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457
(1897).
106. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 5, at 23.
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point in ever invoking the formal procedural apparatus of formal
amendment by the people.
Thus, there is at least a prima facie appearance that in Abraham
the court tried to simultaneously use both originalist and nonoriginalist methods of constitutional interpretation, an attempt
which seems self-inconsistent in light of the fact that originalist and
non-originalist approaches are typically defined as being mutually
exclusive. However, some might wonder whether this prima facie
appearance is only an appearance, one which could be dispelled by
a closer examination. There are at least two ways in which one
might think the appearance of logical incoherence could be
dispelled.
First, one might suppose that the court interpreted the jurytrial provision as having originally been intended to state something
like this: “We, the framers of this constitutional provision, hereby
declare the existence of a constitutional right to a jury trial with
respect to any cause of action, whether existing now in 1857 or
later, upon which any subsequent Minnesota Supreme Court shall
decide to confer a constitutional right to a jury trial.” If the court
had so interpreted the jury-trial provision, then there would be no
appearance of incoherence in its analysis. For, that analysis could
then be interpreted as not invoking any non-originalist method at
all, but rather as straightforwardly invoking only an originalist
method. A court which simply follows original directions of the
framers to “make things up as you go along” could not be justifiably
accused of resorting to non-originalist methods. By definition,
non-originalist methods look to interpretive sources distinct from
and independent of the original document itself. Under the
contemplated hypothesis, that could not be said of the Minnesota
Supreme Court.
There are only two problems with that hypothesis. First, it
seems unlikely that the framers of any constitution would have
drafted a provision with anything even approximating such an
open-ended unlimited intent. Indeed, it seems rather that if that
were the mutual intention of the participants in a constitutional
convention, they would not have even bothered to draft any
provision concerning the issue at all. What would be the point of
drafting a provision whose intended meaning is: “By the way, with
respect to this issue, you can do anything you want”? The basic
motivation for adopting a constitution at all is to limit and constrain
all present and subsequent governmental agencies, including the
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courts. If one has decided ahead of time to allow any and all
subsequent judicial interpretations of the constitutional document
to stand, one might as well save the time and trouble of even
committing the constitution to paper. The second problem is that
there seems to be nothing in the court’s discussion which even
remotely suggests that it intended to adopt such an interpretation
of the jury-trial provision.
The second way in which one might consider trying to avoid
interpreting the court’s opinion as internally inconsistent is to
suppose that the court interpreted the jury-trial provision as having
been originally intended to state something like this: “We, the
framers of this constitutional provision, hereby declare the
existence of a constitutional right to a jury trial with respect to any
cause of action, whether existing now in 1857 or later, which seeks
money damages as the sole relief.”
Unlike the first suggested interpretation of the jury-trial
provision, this interpretation is perhaps at least prima facie
historically plausible. But the difficulty is that there is nothing in
the court’s discussion in Abraham which suggests that it construed
the provision in this way. On the contrary, there is much
suggesting just the opposite. After all, if it had construed the
provision in this second suggested way, its analysis could have been
adequately expressed in just three sentences: “(1)
The
constitutional jury-trial provision provides that any cause of action
seeking only money damages is protected by a constitutional right
to a jury trial. (2) This statutory cause of action seeks only money
damages. (3) Hence, this statutory cause of action is protected by a
constitutional right to a jury trial.” The fact that the court did not
so express itself strongly suggests that it had no such intention.
D. Incompatibility of the Two Approaches
So, what do we have? It seems that we have a judicial opinion
trying to have it both ways. Readers might ask, “But so what?” They
might continue by objecting, “You earlier asserted that any
simultaneous use of originalist and non-originalist methods of
constitutional interpretation is logically incoherent. But I’m not
convinced. Why can’t courts coherently use both methods at the
same time?”
I would respond in the following way: these two methods of
interpretation are indeed incompatible.
The prima facie
appearance of compatibility is primarily caused by the sociological
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fact that courts often describe themselves as resolving constitutional
issues by simultaneously examining both the original intent
motivating the constitutional document itself, on the one hand,
and contemporary non-originalist considerations, on the other,
and they often expressly deny that the simultaneous use of both
methods involves any logical inconsistency. But despite this, I
would maintain that the two methods really are incompatible on
the basis of this argument: [1] In the event of a conflict between
the historical intention motivating a particular constitutional
provision, on the one hand, and contemporary non-originalist
considerations, on the other, there are only two alternatives. [2]
On the one hand, courts can permit the contemporary nonoriginalist considerations to override the historical considerations.
[3] On the other hand, courts can permit the historical
considerations to override the contemporary non-originalist
considerations. [4] But the first alternative is essentially equivalent
to a non-originalist approach, whereas the second alternative is
essentially equivalent to an originalist approach. [5] Hence, the two
approaches are mutually incompatible. In the event of a conflict,
courts are logically compelled to choose between them.
E. Non-Originalism Applied
Assuming that I am right about the mutual incompatibility of
originalist and non-originalist methods of constitutional
interpretation, the only remaining question I shall take up is,
“Which of these alternatives did the court choose to apply in
Abraham?”
I have interpreted the court’s opinion as trying to
simultaneously have it both ways and have quoted two passages in
support of my interpretation—one strongly suggesting the use of
an originalist method, the other strongly suggesting the use of a
non-originalist method. Additional support which could be offered
for my interpretation is the court’s use of an historical test in
resolving the constitutional issue before it. By tracing in elaborate
scholarly detail the “evolution” of the common-law root of breachof-contract causes of action against employers legally available in
1857 down through the common-law derivative of retaliatorydismissal causes of action legally available immediately prior to the
enactment of the Whistleblower Act in 1987 and, from there, down
to the ultimate statutory codification or modification of that
derivative by the Whistleblower Act, the court presumably sought to
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convey the idea that it was simultaneously relying upon both
originalist and non-originalist methods.
But if the simultaneous use of both originalist and nonoriginalist methods is logically inconsistent, then it presumably
follows that, if the court’s analysis in Abraham is to be construed as
logically coherent, it must be construed as selecting one or the
other of these two methods, but not both. I shall argue that its
opinion is most plausibly construed as applying a non-originalist
method.
Here is an argument supporting that interpretation: [1] Any
originalist method of constitutional interpretation imposes
significant limitations upon the class of possible interpretations of
the provision in question. [2] The court’s historical test does not
impose significant limitations upon the class of possible
interpretations of the provision in question. [3] Hence, the court’s
historical test is not an originalist method of constitutional
interpretation. I shall refer to this argument as Argument A.
The argument is deductively valid. Hence, the only relevant
question is whether its premises are true. I will not offer any
argument for premise [1]; its truth seems obvious, at least to me.
This point about obviousness can be put in another way: If [1] is
false then there simply are no originalist methods of constitutional
interpretation at all. That leaves the question of premise [2]’s
truth-value.
I propose that [2] can be supported by focusing once more
upon the court’s historical test for identifying those statutory causes
of action for which there exists a constitutional right to a jury trial.
Recall the essence of that test: Any presently existing Minnesota
statutory cause of action “S” is protected by a constitutional right to
a jury trial if and only if [1] in 1857 there existed a Minnesota
common-law cause of action “C” (the common-law “root”) with
respect to which there was in 1857 a constitutional right to a jury
trial, which [2] eventually evolved by means of judicial
interpretation into a Minnesota common-law cause of action “C*”
(the common-law “derivative”), which, in turn, [3] was eventually
“codified” or “modified” by a statute S, as opposed to being
“replaced” by S.
So, what is the problem? I suggest the problem is this test can
apparently be used to prove that any statutory cause of action
carries with it a constitutional right to a jury trial. In general, given
any common-law cause of action existing in 1857, one can, with
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sufficient ingenuity, link it with any statutory cause of action. There
are at least two reasons for so thinking. The court’s test possesses
two features which give it indefinitely large degrees of flexibility.
One of those features concerns the purported relationship
between two causes of action, the 1857 cause of action I have been
referring to as the common-law root, C, on the one hand, and the
later cause of action I have been referring to as the common-law
derivative, C*, on the other. The underlying jurisprudential
question is, “Under what circumstances is a later cause of action
(here, C*) merely an evolutionary modification of an earlier cause
of action (here, C), as opposed to simply being a different cause of
action altogether?” The corresponding underlying jurisprudential
problem is that, while the earlier cases exemplifying C will
inevitably share some legal features with the later cases
exemplifying C*, they will not share others. Hence, by selectively
describing the characteristics the two lines of cases share, one can
make it look as if C* really is just a later evolutionary stage of C.
On the other hand, by emphasizing the characteristics the two sets
of cases fail to share, one can also make it look as if C* is not a later
evolutionary stage of C at all, but rather a different cause of action
altogether.
The availability of this flexibility can be illustrated in terms of
the court’s own discussion in Abraham. The court’s purported
107
common-law root was first exemplified in Mackubin v. Clarkson in
1861. Its purported common-law derivative was exemplified in
108
Phipps v. Clark Oil & Refining Corp. in 1986. On the one hand, it
is possible to describe these two cases as cases in which an
employee sues its employer for money damages for a wrongful
termination. Using that level of semantic generality, it is easy to
make it look as if the cause of action exemplified in Phipps is merely
a later stage of the cause of action exemplified in Mackubin.
On the other hand, it is also possible to describe these two
cases in a very different way. One can characterize Mackubin as a
case in which an employee sues his private employer for money
damages for a wrongful termination on a breach-of-contract theory,
at a time when the rule of sovereign immunity precludes public
109
employees from suing their employers, and at a time when
107. 5 Minn. 247 (1861).
108. 408 N.W.2d 569 (Minn. 1986).
109. The doctrine of sovereign immunity with respect to tort liability was
judicially abrogated in Spanel v. Mounds View School Dist., 264 Minn. 279, 188
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private employees who are not parties to employment contracts are
at the mercy of the employment-at-will doctrine. On the other
hand, one can characterize Phipps as a case in which an employee
sues a private employer for money damages for a wrongful
termination, where the employee does not have to rely upon a
breach-of-contract theory because of the earlier demise of the atwill doctrine, and where, although the employee happens to sue a
private employer, he could have also sued a public employer, were
he employed by one, because of the earlier demise of the
sovereign-immunity doctrine. Thus, using this more specific level
of semantic generality, it is possible to make it look as though the
cause of action exemplified in Phipps is not a later stage of the
cause of action exemplified in Mackubin at all, but rather a new and
different cause of action.
I said earlier that the court’s historical test possesses two
features which give it indefinitely large degrees of flexibility. The
second feature concerns the relationship between the purported
common-law derivative C* and S, the purported statutory
codification or modification of C* (as opposed to the
“replacement” of C*).
The underlying jurisprudential problem in this context is the
same as the just-discussed problem concerning the relationship
between C and C*, namely, the availability of varying levels of
semantic description. On the one hand, it is possible to
characterize C* and S so as to make it look as if S is merely a
“codification” or “modification” of C*, as opposed to being a
“replacement” of C*. On the other hand, it is also possible to
characterize C* and S so as to make it look as if S is a replacement
of C*. At least one reason for thinking so is that any common law
cause of action shares at least one legal characteristic with any
statutory cause of action, on the one hand, and differs from that
statutory cause of action with at least one other characteristic, on
the other. Given this general fact, by focusing upon one or the
other of these characteristics it is possible to characterize the
relation between C* and S either as a mere “codification” or
“modification”, on the one hand, or as a “replacement,” on the
other.
The availability of these two alternatives can be illustrated in

N.W.2d 795 (1962). For the subsequent legislative abrogation, see M INN. STAT. §
3.736 (2000).
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terms of the court’s own discussion. Let Phipps be the purported
common-law derivative C* and the Whistleblower Act be C*’s
purported statutory codification, S. By suitably describing Phipps
and the Whistleblower Act, one can make it look as if the latter is
merely a codification or modification of Phipps.
For example, it is possible to describe the cause of action
exemplified in Phipps as suing one’s employer for money damages for a
wrongful termination, on the one hand, and to describe the cause of
action exemplified in the Whistleblower Act as suing one’s employer
for money damages for wrongful termination, on the other.
Characterizing the two causes of action at this level of semantic
generality makes it look as if S is merely a codification or
modification of C*.
On the other hand, it is possible to characterize the cause of
action exemplified in Phipps as suing one’s employer for money damages
for a wrongful termination, where the plaintiff has a right to a jury trial,
on the one hand, and the cause of action exemplified in the
Whistleblower Act as suing one’s employer for money damages for a
wrongful termination, where the plaintiff has no right to a jury trial, on
the other. Describing the two causes of action at this level of
semantic generality makes it look as if S is not a codification or
modification of C*, but rather a replacement.
It might be argued in defense of the court’s distinction
between codification/modification, on the one hand, and
replacement, on the other, that if some particular statute goes “too
far” it would be obvious to the court and to everyone else that the
statute was a replacement, rather than a codification/modification.
It might be argued that in such a case the court would hold the
line.
But perhaps not. In support of such a doubt, one could
110
mention the court’s own ruling in Breimhorst v. Beckman that the
111
Workers’ Compensation Act was a “replacement” of the commonlaw cause of action employees had against their employers for
personal injuries, rather than a mere “codification/modification”
of that cause of action. Now, as the court itself emphasized in
Abraham, the Workers’ Compensation Act substituted an
administrative process for a judicial process. That seems to have
been a very radical change. But consider the following possibility.

110.
111.

227 Minn. 409, 35 N.W.2d 719 (1949).
See M INN. STAT. §§ 176.01-.81 (1949).
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Suppose that the Minnesota Legislature were to substitute
administrative proceedings without juries for all common-law tort
and breach-of-contract actions. Such a legislative action would
seem to come pretty close to a total elimination of jury trials in civil
actions. It seems easy to imagine, the court being so distressed by
that elimination that it would find some way to tie that hypothetical
statute to some common-law root and common-law derivative. If so,
so much the worse for the line the court drew in Breimhorst.
Thus, it seems that the court’s historical test does not provide
any significant degree of restriction upon the class of possible
constitutional interpretations. Consequently, the conclusion of
Argument A—that the court’s historical test is not an originalist
test—seems to have been established.
Indeed, given what the court said in Abraham about the
“present” meaning of “action at law”, it seems that it does not even
need the historical test. As Wittgenstein famously observed, “a
wheel that can be turned though nothing else moves with it, is not
112
part of the mechanism.” Apparently, the court views itself as
having the power to simply decree the present meaning of “action
at law,” based upon whatever its own philosophical intuitions
dictate as to which statutory causes of action ought to have jury trials,
despite what the Legislature might or might not think.
Presumably, the court would even have the power to declare that
the term “action at law” should, on contemporary philosophical
grounds, be construed as semantically including even “equitable”
actions, a ruling that would obliterate the traditional distinction
between law and equity.
But if the semantical content of words in constitutional texts
can vary as the court grasps them, with the philosophical and
political exigencies of the moment, then why not? After all, words
are nothing but syntactic types semantically tied to particular
meanings. The words, understood as syntactic types, can persist
over time, while their associated meanings can vary.
VI. CONCLUSION
I have argued that in Abraham the court tried to simultaneously
use both originalist and non-originalist methods of constitutional
interpretation and that it formulated and applied a complicated
112. LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS, ¶ 271 at 95e
(G.E.M. Anscombe trans., The Macmillan Company, 2d ed. 1968).
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historical test to bridge the apparent gap. I have also argued that
because the gap is not only apparent, but real, it cannot be bridged
by any device, no matter how legally sophisticated. Originalist and
non-originalist methods are mutually exclusive as a matter of logic.
As for the historical test, I would recommend that the court discard
it. So far as I can see, it just gets in the way, frustrating any effort to
decide cases on a transparent basis. Once free of the historical test,
the court would be free to choose such publicly clear and
transparent methods of deciding constitutional issues. On the one
hand, it could choose to explicitly adopt an originalist approach
and publicly abandon any recourse to non-originalist methods. On
the other, it could publicly adopt a non-originalist approach and
ignore the history.
In terms of the question presented in Abraham, the court
would have the opportunity of explicitly choosing between two very
different formulations of the constitutional issue: [1] Does the jurytrial provision of the Minnesota Constitution, as intended by its
framers in 1857, require jury trials for claims brought under the
Whistleblower Act? [2] Do contemporary philosophical, political,
and ideological considerations, as evaluated by the court, prove
that it would be desirable to provide for jury trials for claims
brought under the Whistleblower Act? Either formulation would
constitute an important step in the direction of deciding the case
on the basis of publicly clear and transparent grounds.
The gain for both the public and the court would be increased
clarity. In my view, everyone ought to be able to agree upon at
least one proposition - a necessary condition for a healthy
democracy is clear and transparent governmental operations.
There could never be sufficiently strong reasons for disguising the
ways in which governmental power is actually wielded. If the courts
are not making it up as they go along, the public has a right to
know that. If they are, the public has a right to know that too.
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